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What is an injunction? 
An injunction is a remedy originally devised in the Court of Chancery in England, 
mainly, it appears, for the purpose of bringing proceedings in the courts of common law 
to a halt and having the cases transferred to Chancery (Baker, 1979, pp. 90-91). Today it 
is an important judicial remedy used in many different situations, sometimes alone, 
sometimes in combination with other remedies such as damages. An injunction is a 
discretionary remedy, directed at a particular person, ordering that person to either do 
something (a mandatory injunction) or to stop doing or not to do something (a restrictive 
injunction). I Since an injunction is an order of the High Court, a person who wilfully 
disobeys it - as is the case with any court order - has committed a contempt of court. 
Although such a contempt is a "civil" rather than a "criminal" contempt, the consequences 
can be exceptionally severe. The alleged contemnor can be fined or committed to jail by 
an order of the court, and can be detained in custody until the fmes are paid or the order is 
complied with. Although matters are rarely taken so far , the threat of such alarming 
possibilities usually means that injunctions are instantly obeyed. 
There are a number of sub-species of injunctions, of which the most familiar is the 
interim or interlocutory injunction. This is an injunction which is obtained to protect the 
status quo until such time as the court hears the substantive case. Quite frequently such 
interim injunctions will be renewed by consent of the parties and can thus remain in force 
for months or longer. Obtaining an interim injunction involves one or two day's very hard 
- and expensive - work from your solicitor, but generally one can be obtained relatively 
easily. 
Courts approach the matter usually on the basis that, provided on the evidence there seems 
to be a genuine dispute, ("a serious issue to be tried" as it was put in the leading case of 
American Cyanimid v Ethicon ) the status quo should be preserved. In American 
Cyanimid Lord Diplock states that "The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is 
not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried."(p. 
510) Then; 
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It is defined in Halsbury as "a judicial remedy by which a person is ordered to refrain from 
doing or to do a particular act or thing". (Halsbury, 4th ed., vol. 511.) 
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where there is doubt as 10 the adequacy of the respecuve remedies in damages av~ilable 
to either party or to both, that the question of the balance of convemence artses ... 
Where other factors appear 10 be evenly balanced it is a counsel of prudence to take 
such measures as arc calculated to preserve the status quo." (p. 511). 
The American Cyanimid approach has been specifically endorsed by the Court of Appeal 
in Consolidated Traders v Downes and has been applied m var1ous mdustnal law cases 
by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal2. 
The evidence will invariably be in the form of written statements (affidavits), which an 
efficient solicitor can prepare in a matter of hours . This affidavit evidence is not normally 
subject to cross- examination: usually there is not time for that Sometimes the court will 
issue an injunction without the other side even knowing that the application has been 
filed: it is then said to be obtained ex parte. The court will do this if the judge believes 
that on the evidence before her the matter is either one of particular urgency, or there is 
not time to serve the papers on the other party. Again, this will have to be sufficiently 
documented in the affidavits, but in a suitable case that is not typically a problem for an 
experienced solicitor. Along with the application itself and the supporting affidavits it is 
necessary to file the statement of claim (of which more later) and an "undertaking as to 
damages". The latter is an undertaking to the effect that should a permanent injunction not 
be granted at the end of the substantive case the defendant will be indemnified against any 
loss caused to her by the interim injunction .In American Cyanimid the House of Lords 
explained the role of the undertaking as to damages as follows: 
It is no part of the court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve 
conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may 
ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed 
argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. 
One of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as 
to damages on the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that 'it aided the court in 
doing that which was its great object, viz abstaining from expressing any opinion on 
the merits of the case until the hearing.(p. 510). 
Apart from an interim injunction, the other principal category is a permanent (or "final" 
or "perpetual") injunction - this being an injunction granted by the court not as an interim 
measure but as a final remedy once the main case has been heard. The usual remedy in 
em! cases IS damages, but there are certain situations of "continuing" damage where an 
InJuncuon IS a proper remedy, usually issued as a supplement to, not in substitution of, 
damages. Another t~ of injunction is an injunction quia timet (lit. "because he fears"). 
Th1s IS an InJunctiOn ISSued to restrain future probable damage to property. The 
requ1rements here are a little more stringent: the court must be satisfied for example that 
the feared injury will be irreparable. ' ' 
Injunctions and contempt of court 
2 
Examples are: Harder v NZ Tramways Union, Mid-CanJerbury Stores v CanJerbury Stores 
Uruon, Columbus Maritime Services Ltd v New Zealand Seamens Union JUW and 
FederaJed Cooks and Stewards IUW, and New Zealand Baking Trades Employees' JUW v 
General Foods CorporaJion (N.Z.) Lld. 
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Non-compliance with a court order issued in the course of civil proceedings is classed as a 
"civil" contempt, which means that the party who claims to be disadvantaged by the 
alleged contempt has to take an additional step of bringing enforcement proceedings before 
the courL The court has a wide discretion as to what it can do. Often it will fine a person 
or body (such as a union) alleged to be in contempt rather than resort to the sanction of 
imprisonment, but the consequences can nevertheless be dire. An example is the 1986 
Australian case of Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station 
Pty. Ltd . Here an employer brought civil contempt proceedings against a union after it 
had ignored an interim injunction requiring it to desist from picketing. The union was 
fined $10 ()()()for the contempt and the court ordered it to additionally pay $2 000 per day 
for each day that the contempt continued. The union continued to picket the employer's 
premises, and by the time the court heard the substantive case the amount payable had 
reached a figure of $44 000. After the hearing the court issued a permanent injunction , 
but the union carried on with its defiance with the result that the court sequestrated its 
assets (to the amount of $2.3 million), and the fines and costs were exacted from the 
sequestrated funds. The union would not comply with the final injunction either, which 
led to a further fine of $100 000 and a further round of sequestration proceedings. 
The Labour Court is given a statutory power to punish for contempt in the face of the 
court (s. 281), this being criminal, not civil contempt- for example, threatening the judge 
or witnesses, or obstructing court proceedings. Otherwise the Labour Relations Act 
contains no further specific references to power to punish for contempt. Section 278, 
however, stipulates that the Court shall have "all the powers inherent in a Court of 
record". Although there is possibly some ambiguity as to whether the Labour Court is a 
"superior" or an "inferior" court of record - which category it is in will affect its ability to 
punish for contempt - it seems safe to say that the Labour Court has the same powers to 
punish for contempt as does the High Court. If so, it can fine, imprison and sequester in 
order to enforce its own orders. Whether the Court will take such steps is a different 
matter, but of its power in this regard there is little doubt. 
Causes of action 
An application for an injunction must be based on an alleged breach of the law - for 
instance that a contract has been breached, or that a tort IS about to be, or has been, 
committed. (Torts are civil wrongs other than breaches of contract: examples are 
negligence, nuisance, trespass, defamation.) When seeking an interim injunction a 
statement of claim relating to the substantive case has to be filed along with all the other 
documents. The court must be satisfied that the application is based on some recognised, 
and properly documented, breach of law. Again, this requirement is not too difficult for a 
good solicitor to comply with, although preparing the statement of claim will usually be 
the most taxing of the many tasks she will have to do at short notice in order to obtain an 
interim injunction. In the labour law field she will be assisted in this task by the 
especially complex and intractable nature of the main tort actions governing industrial 
disputes. 
It is not even clear exactly how many of these so-called "economic torts" there are, let 
alone what their precise scope is. The Labour Relations Act gives to the Labour Court 
exclusive jurisdiction for tort actions "where a strike or lockout is occurring or has 
occurred and as a result proceedings are issued against any party to the strike or lockout" 
(s. 242). ("Strike", be it noted, is defined very widely indeed ins. 231.) The four torts 
listed in section 242 of the Act are conspiracy, intimidation, inducement of breach of 
contract, and interference by unlawful means with trade, business or employment. The 
law relating to these torts is notably difficult and obscure, compounded by the fact that 
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most of the case-law has developed in the United Kingdom where the general structure of 
labour law is very different from that in this country. Determmmg how the econom1c 
torts ought to be applied here requires a thorough grasp of the many differences m the 
legal position of trade unions in New Zealand and the Unned Kmgdom. To devise 
something that at least looks like a proper cause of actwn out of th1s legal morass IS a 
relatively easy task. A little knowledge can be made to go a very long way. At short 
notice a judge will be unable to tell whether the facts set out m the affidavitS and the 
statement of claim fit within the legal definitions of the economic torts or not. Th1s 
could take days of legal argument to clarify, supposing it is capable of clarification. At 
the stage of hearing an application for an interim injunction a JUdge will usually have 
little choice but to accept the statement of claim at face value. 
This is worth emphasising in view of the fact that the "labour injunction", as it is styled, 
is not a wholly respectable procedure. Many commentators- such as Wedderburn (1986, 
ch. 8)- point out, quite correctly, that the real purpose of an interim injunction m the 
industrial arena is to bring a strike to an end, not to hold the status quo until the 1ssues 
can be traversed at the hearing of the main case. The substantive case is a fiction: more 
often than not, it never takes place. Certainly the ambiguities and complexities 
surrounding the law on the economic torts greatly facilitates the use of the interim 
injunction in this manner, although whether to use the procedures in such a way is 
"improper" is a moot point. Bringing proceedings for an interim injunction while never 
seriously intending to proceed with the substantive case is certainly not a practice confined 
to the area of labour law. 
The use of the interim injunction as a weapon in industrial relations is a practice which 
has developed out of a sequence of historical accidents. The interim injunction was never 
specifically designed by the courts to deliberately make life difficult for unions. Although 
union defendants to interim injunctions undoubtedly do face a number of very real tactical 
disadvantages, this is attributable to a combination of historical and procedural 
circumstances, not deliberate judicial policy. It is questionable whether it should have 
been the task of the ordinary courts to create a workable legal structure for industrial 
relations. However with the Labour Relations Act 1987 our legislators, as part of a 
supposedly rational design, have given statutory sanction to the role of labour 
injunctions by specifically giving to the Labour Court an exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
and determine them. Clearly our legislators, at least, believe that the labour injunction 
has a proper place in a rationaJ scheme of industrial law. It is, however, not easy to see 
what that place might be. 
Matters of evidence and proof 
The proper approach to be taken by a court when it has been requested to issue an interim 
injunction, according to the House of Lords in the American Cyanimid decision, involves 
a two-stage process. First, it must ask whether, on the evidence before it there is a 
serious issue to be tried. As indicated already, it is not too difficult for cou'nsel for an 
applicant in an industriaJ law case to at least create the impression that there is an issue to 
be tned. Then the court must inquire about the "balance of inconvenience". Who will be 
most inconvenienced if the injunction is refused? Usually there can only be one answer. 
The employer who has filed a thick affidavit listing the probable losses that will occur to 
~1s busmess m ~e event of a strike has an obvious tactical advantage over a union. The 
. mconvemence likely to be faced by the union is rather hard to explain to a High Court 
Judge or to document m an affidavit. Nor is the position significantly affected by the 
~ansference o.: JUnsdictJon to the Labour Court, as will be seen. What is the 
mconvemence to a umon? A nsk of declining living standards for its members perhaps? 
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This, of course, is a long-term matter which is difficult to balance against the immediate 
risks to an employer. This does seem to indicate that in this context the interim 
injunction in an inherently unfair weapon. f 
The balance of proof, as in all civil cases, falls on the applicant or plaintiff. The 
appropriate standard is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities, a much less 
demanding requirement than the standard of proof required in a criminal case. In this 
context what has to be proved is more significant than the standard of proof itself. The 
applicant must convince the court on the balance of probabilities that there is a serious 
issue to be tried, and that he will be more inconvenienced than the respondent in the event 
of the injunction being refused. These are not difficult obstacles. 
The Labour Court and injunctions 
One important effect of the 1987 Act has been to remove from the High Court injunction 
proceedings and tort actions arising out of strikes and lockouts. These are now vested in 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Obviously the objective is to benefit from 
the specialist skills and experience of the Labour Court judges. 
The Labour Court has the power to make its own rules, by section 307. Section 307(2), 
which deals with the procedures governing injunctions, economic torts and applications 
for review, provides: 
To the extent that the Labour Court does not make rules under subsection (I) of this 
section regulating the practice and procedure of the Court under section 242 and 
section 243 and section 280 of this Act, proceedings in the Labour Court under those 
sections shall be regulated by the rules applicable to proceedings founded on tort, 
injunctions, and judicial review in the High Court, as far as they are applicable and 
with all necessary modifications. 
This therefore empowers the Court to make its own rules relating to injunction 
proceedings; to the extent that it has not done so the procedures of the High Court will 
continue to apply. I understand that the Labour Court does not intend to issue any 
procedural rules of its own, however , but will instead apply the High Court rules.3 
Procedurally, then, nothing has changed. 
Although the Court is empowered to decide the cases that come before it "in equity and 
good conscience" (sees. 279(4), and s. 303), this does not apply to matters arising under 
section 242 (economic torts), section 243 (injunctions) and section 280 (applications for 
review).4 Moreover, by section 309 any party to any proceedings founded on the 
economic torts can appeal to the Court of Appeal "against any interlocutory or final order 
of the Labour Court in the proceedings". Taken together, these various sections mean that 
the approach of the Labour Court to injunction proceedings must be essentially the same 
as the High Court. A relatively strict adherence to precedent and legal formality is 
required. It is legitimate to wonder why the effort was made to transfer these proceedings 
to the Labour Court in the first place. The forum for hearing labour injunctions has 
This is based on a personal discussion with the Registrar of the Court in February 1988. 
4 s. 279 (4). 
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changed its name, but nothing else. In view of th~ statutory ~onstraints placed on the 
Labour Court, it is hard to see how the spec1al expenence of the Judges can be put to use. 
Procedurally, then, there have been no changes. In terms of substantive law, however, 
there has been a major change. The effect of s. 243(3) and s. 233 IS that no proceedmgs 
relating either to injunctions or to the economic torts can be brought for Strikes or 
lockouts arising out of "lawful" disputes of interest. Th1s termmology requues some 
careful consideration, as the statutory definitions of "disputes of interest", "lawful strikes" 
and "unlawful strikes" are all rather complicated. I will move through the definitions step 
by step. 
(a) "Disputes of Interest" and "Disputes of Rights" -
This is familiar terminology and the respective definitions are set out in s. 2, the 
definition section of the Act. A dispute of interest is a dispute between an employer and 
a union "created with intent to procure an agreement or award". A dispute of rights 
means a dispute "concerning the interpretation, application, or operation of an agreement" . 
(b) "Lawful" Strikes and Lockouts-
A strike is "lawful" when: 
It relates to a dispute of interest provided that the date of expiry of the existing 
award or agreement is not more than 60 days after the date of the agreement (s. 
233(l)(a) ); ,~~..<. 
It relates to a dispute of rights "created with intent to procure an award or 
agreement to cover workers not currently covered by an award or agreement" (s. 
233(l)(b) ); 
It relates to a "new matter" (s. 233(1)(c) ); 
It relates to a redundancy agreement where there is no redundancy agreement in 
existence, and "the only workers involved in the strike are those of the employer 
to whom the redundancy agreement will apply" (s . 233(l)(d) ). 
(c) "Unlawful" Strikes and Lockouts 
Section 234(1) stipulates that a strike or lockout shall be unlawful if it concerns-
A dispute of rights: or 
A personal grievance that can be submitted to a grievance committee or the 
Labour Court; or 
Demarcation issues; or 
Union membership; or 
Cancellation of a union's registration under this Act. 
Clearly a great deal turns on whether a strike is classed as "lawful" or "unlawful". It 
should be remembered that when seeking an interim injunction all that is necessary is that 
the applicant convmces the court that on the "balance of probabilities" there is a "serious 
1ssue" as to whether a strike is, or is not, unlawful. How much of an impediment this is 
likely to be remams to be seen. Creating an impression from the documents that a strike 
is possibly unlawful is not likely to baffle the ingenuity of a good lawyer for too long . 
Even if a strik~ is "un.lawful" it does not follow that an employer will necessarily succeed 
m h1s substantive cla1m f?r damages. The effect of a strike being classed as "unlawful" 
means merely that the umon loses 1ts statutory immunity. The employer will still need 
to establish that the umon IS liable at common law . It will have to be shown that the 
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union's actions fall within the kinds of conduct proscribed by the economic torts , and that 
none of the recognised common-law defences, such as justification, apply .5 
Compliance orders 
A compliance order is in essence a simplified kind of injunction. The Labour Court is, by 
s. 207, empowered to order compliance "with any provision of this Act, or of any award 
or agreement or of any rule of a union", or with orders of the Labour Court itself, of the 
Arbitration Commission, or of a grievance committee or the Registrar of Unions. Such 
proceedings can be brought by any person or organisation who has been "prejudicially 
affected" by the non-compliance (s. 207(2) ). This statutory definition of who has the 
right to bring an application for a compliance order contrasts with the situation regarding 
injunctions, where the common-law rules about who has standing to bring proceedings are 
left unaltered by the Act. 
The consequences of failing to comply with an order are set out in s.207(7). These 
include imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or a fine of not more than 
$5,000: somewhat less fearsome than the consequences of being in contempt of court. 
The availability of the new remedy of a compliance order does raise once again the 
question of why injunction proceedings have been retained in the industrial arena. 
Conclusion 
In relation to interim injunctions there have been no procedural changes of any kind. This 
will mean that the well-recognised tactical disadvantages face.lby a trade union defendant 
to injunction proceedings will simply be perpetuated. Although there has been a major 
change to the substantive law of labour injunctions, in that it is now no longer possible 
to obtain an interim injunction for a strike arising out of a dispute of interest, it is 
probable that this will not seriously hamper injunction proceedings at the interlocutory 
stage 
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